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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Weston Kenneth Nelson appeals from the summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Nelson pied guilty to burglary and the court sentenced him to a unified 10year sentence with the first six years determinate.

State v. Nelson, 2012

Unpublished Opinion No. 598, Docket No. 39429 (August 21, 2012). Nelson filed
a motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant to Rule 35, which the district
court denied.

kl

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of

Nelson's Rule 35 motion.

kl

Nelson filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting four claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, an involuntary guilty plea, and a
"disproportionate" sentence.

(R., pp.14-17.)

Nelson's requested relief was a

reduction of his sentence to a six-year fixed term.

(R., p.16.)

The state

answered the petition and moved to dismiss it. (R., pp.33-36.) At hearing on the
state's motion, Nelson's counsel conceded all but one of Nelson's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. (Tr., p.3, L.25 - p.5, L.21.) At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and dismissed Nelson's
petition. (R., pp.55-56.) Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.57-60, 65,
66-7.)
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ISSUES
Nelson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court err in granting the State's motion for summary
dismissal of Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, and
his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into,
based upon counsel falsely advising Mr. Nelson that he was eligible for a
problem-solving court, while knowing that he was not?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Must this Court decline to consider Nelson's appellate claim because
defense counsel below waived the issue as to all but one claim not addressed on
appeal?
2.
Alternatively, has Nelson failed to show error in the summary dismissal of
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in relation to his guilty plea?

2

ARGUMENTS

I.
The Issue Of Whether The District Court Erred When Summarily Dismissing
Nelson's Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Providing "Faulty
Advice" Regarding His Change Of Plea Is Not Properly Before This Court
Because it was waived by counsel's concessions during a hearing on the
state's motion to dismiss, the issue of whether the district court erred in
summarily dismissing Nelson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for
providing "faulty advice" in relation to his guilty plea is not properly before this
Court on appeal.
At the outset of the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal,
Nelson's attorney addressed the claims in Nelson's petition.

Specifically, he

addressed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it related to Nelson's
guilty plea:
So he has four counts of ineffective assistance of counsel by
allowing him to plead guilty to burglary.
In my review of the change of plea hearing and the
sentencing hearing, I believe the transcripts of those proceedings
does [sic] not support his allegation in 1(A).
In 1(8), he indicates "She advised me to plead guilty with the
intent of entering a problem-solving court." He did apply for the
problem-solving courts, and he was turned down from Drug Court.
He was turned down from Wood Pilot Court. And he was also
turned down for Mental Health Court. So I don't see that his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is supported in (8) either.
(Tr., p.4, Ls.2-16.)
The district court likewise believed this issue was no longer before the
court and only addressed a separate issue regarding the plea negotiations in its
comments:
3

In reviewing both the plea agreement and the prior record,
recognizing that the sentencing judge was not bound by the plea
agreement in the first place, nor was the prosecuting attorney
bound to limit his recommendation of incarceration by the plea
agreement, I'm going to deny the motion in this particular matter or deny the petition, I should say, in this particular matter.
I will also comment that there had been an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Idaho in this particular matter. And many issues,
as you pointed out in your brief, Mr. Cornelison [attorney
representing the state], were raised, but none of them were raised
that were raised in the petition and could have been raised in this
particular matter. And, therefore, on that basis, I'm going to deny
the petition for post-conviction relief. The order will reflect that
ruling at this point.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.8-24.)
As evidenced above, the only question left for the district court's
determination at the motion for summary dismissal of Nelson's petition for postconviction relief was a question of whether or not the state violated the plea
agreement.

As such, the issue presented by Nelson in his opening brief has

been waived through the concession of his post-conviction relief counsel and is
not properly before this Court. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,
976 (2010) (claims not preserved for appellate review will not be considered).

II.
Alternatively, The District Court Properly Dismissed Nelson's Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel In Relation To The Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Nelson pied guilty to burglary and the court sentenced him to a unified 10-

year sentence with the first six years determinate.

State v. Nelson, 2012

Unpublished Opinion No. 598, *1 (August 21, 2012). In post-conviction Nelson
asserted he entered his guilty plea based upon the "faulty advice" of counsel.
4

(R., p. 11.) Specifically, Nelson alleged his trial counsel advised him to plead

guilty "with the intent of entered a problem solving court" and told him that he
"met the qualifications" for such court even though she knew he did not. (Id.) On
appeal, Nelson argues the trial court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.)

For the reasons set forth in Section I., supra, this

Court should decline to consider Nelson's appellate claims. Even assuming the
Court addresses Nelson's arguments, they fail. A review of the record and the
applicable law shows Nelson failed to present a genuine issue of material fact
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). However, the
Court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
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unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law.
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001 ).

C.

Applicable Legal Standards
Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a

post-conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." In order to survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must
present evidence in support of his petition sufficient to make "a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in
the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). While a court
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

In other words, bare or conclusory

allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to
an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v.
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State,
108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d 860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985).
6

D.

Nelson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Nelson pied guilty to burglary in exchange for the state's agreement to

concur with the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendation. (39429
Tr.1, p.9, L.4- p.12, L.5.) Nelson asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief
that his counsel was ineffective for giving him faulty advice regarding his potential
drug court eligibility. (R., pp.15-16.) In his sworn affidavit in support of his postconviction petition, Nelson asserted:
Ms. Campbell advised me to plead guilty as charged with the intent
of entering a problem solving court. (Drug-court or Wood pilot).
Ms. Campbell was a member of the board that approves or denies
applicants and she told me that I met the qualifications. On her
advice, I plead [sic] guilty and applied to the problem-solving courts
and was immediatly [sic] denied because I am a resident of Utah
and "have no local ties and support to do the programs." This is
information Ms. Campbell had prior to giving me the faulty advice.
(R., p.11.)

The state moved to dismiss this allegation, in part, on Nelson's bare

and conclusory allegations (R., p.49), which are insufficient to establish either the
deficient performance of counsel or any correlating prejudice. Nelson has failed
to allege an actionable deficiency in his counsel's advice to plead guilty. There is
no allegation Nelson was promised he would get into a problem solving court.
Although Nelson advised the court of his desire to apply for a problem-solving
court when he pied guilty, the record shows Nelson was aware of the possibility

The transcript cited is of the 6/27/11 change of plea hearing in Nelson's
underlying criminal case.
1
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that he could instead receive a prison sentence. (See generally 39429 Tr., pp.610.)
In the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Idaho
Supreme Court has articulated the applicable standards as follows:
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel to survive a summary dismissal,
the petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a
material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced
the applicant's case. . ...
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the
petitioner to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a
strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent.
Thus, the claimant has the burden of showing that his attorney's
performance fell below the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.
To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable
probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Trial
counsel's strategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed
on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation.
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008)
(internal citations omitted).
Even assuming, for purposes of summary dismissal, that counsel misled
Nelson regarding his chances of getting into drug court, Nelson failed to present
any claim or evidence of prejudice. At a change of plea hearing, Nelson advised
the court that although he had experienced "drug problems" "in the past," he was
not addicted to drugs or alcohol.

(39429 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-13.)

Nevertheless,

Nelson's counsel requested the court order a substance abuse evaluation
8

because it was Nelson's intent "to apply to Wood Court." (39429 Tr., p.6, Ls.2224 (emphasis added).) During his lengthy plea colloquy, Nelson told the court,
under oath, that he understood the charges to which he was pleading, the rights
he was waiving by doing so, and that he was pleading guilty freely and
voluntarily. (See generally 39429 Tr., pp.5-15.)
The record shows Nelson understood the nature of the charges against
him and had not been coerced into pleading guilty. (See 39429 Tr., p.8, L.10 p.9, L.3.) Nelson was advised of and understood he gave up his right to a jury
trial by pleading guilty. (39429 Tr., p.11, Ls.19-24.)

Although he claims on

appeal that he pied guilty to burglary based on faulty advice that he qualified for
drug court (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8), the record established Nelson was aware of
the consequences of his plea and understood the ultimate sentence he could
receive was at the discretion of the court:
THE COURT:
That presentence report will make a
recommendation of either probation, retained jurisdiction, or prison.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
And so if they recommend prison, the [the
prosecutor] can come here at sentencing and make that
recommendation and still be in compliance with the plea
agreement. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
THE COURT:
Now, if it recommends probation, [the state is]
bound to recommend that. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
All right. You understand that even though the
plea agreement provides for certain recommendations from the
9

state and that your attorney will make recommendations, do you
understand I'm not bound to follow either of those
recommendations?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
And do you understand I'm not bound to follow
the recommendation in the presentence report?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
Do you understand, if I don't follow the
recommendations, you can't on that basis alone come back in and
seek to withdraw your guilty plea?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT:

Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
guilty?

Is anyone forcing or pressuring you to plead

THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:
Has anyone promised you that I would be easy
on you if you pied guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:
Has anyone promised or suggested that I'd
place you on probation if you pied guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
(39429 Tr., p.9, L.10 - p.10, L.24.)
Nelson fails to even address the prejudice prong of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. To establish prejudice in relation to his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, Nelson was required to show a reasonable
probability that, had counsel not advised him that he was eligible to participate in
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a problem solving court, Nelson would not have pied guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.

Nelson made no such allegation in his post-conviction

petition, nor does he on appeal.

Rather, he alleged only that he pied guilty

"based on this false advice." (Appellant's brief, p.7.).

There is no evidence that

Nelson would in fact have made the choice to forgo the plea agreement wherein
the state agreed not to file additional charges and not to file a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement (39429 R., p.54 (Nelson's guilty plea questionnaire))
and instead insist on his previously waived right to a trial.
That Nelson may have hoped for a sentence different from the one he
received was not sufficient to raise a viable ineffective assistance of counsel
claim; the record shows that he discussed the promises that were actually made
regarding his plea agreement and was aware that the court alone would decide
an appropriate sentence.

In short, Nelson's allegations were not sufficient to

raise a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he at no time
claimed or presented evidence he would have reasonably insisted on going to
trial but for counsel's statement regarding his eligibility for drug court.

E.

Nelson Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On His Claim
That The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard
Finally, on appeal Nelson claims the district applied an incorrect legal

standard

in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction

relief.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Specifically, he argues that because the "district court
appear[ed] to have agreed with [the state's] proposition" below that Nelson's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should have been raised on direct
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appeal, the denial of such claim was erroneous. (Id. at pp.9.8-9.) Nelson's claim
fails for two reasons.
First, it is not apparent the district court actually applied an incorrect legal
standard to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel challenged on appeal.
Nelson's counsel conceded the issue, so it was not before the when it ruled upon
the state's motion for summary dismissal.

When discussing the standard of

review, the court was addressing the non-waived claims in Nelson's petition
(such as his sentencing claim).
Second, even if the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, the
error was harmless. I.R.C.P. 61. The state moved for summary dismissal on
several grounds, one of which was that Nelson's claim was conclusory and there
was no issue of fact as to either deficient performance or prejudice.

For the

reasons set forth above, Nelson's petition would have been properly dismissed
on this basis.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Nelson's petition for post-conviction relief.
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